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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
—— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20010809-SC 
Ct.App. No. 20000541-CA 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in 
State v. Wanosik* 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615 (addendum A), which vacated 
defendant's sentence imposed in absentia. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(a) (Supp. 
2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. When a defendant is notified of his sentencing hearing, but fails to appear, 
must the State produce evidence that it has searched for the defendant before the 
trial court can presume that the defendant is voluntarily absent? 
On a writ of certiorari, this Court fcWreview[s] the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness and gives its conclusions of law no deference." Newspaper Agency Corp. v. 
Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997). Who has the burden of proof or the 
burden of production and what evidence suffices to meet that burden are legal questions. 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 2414 8. 
2. Does Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, require a trial court to 
affirmatively seek sentencing input from (a) defense counsel and (b) the prosecutor, 
even without a request or objection? 
The interpretation of a rule is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. 
Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 15, 16 P.3d 540. 
3. When a trial court sentences a defendant without seeking sentencing input 
from both defense counsel and the prosecutor, is the resulting sentence "a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner" under rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., subject to 
challenge at any time? 
This question also requires interpretation of a rule. Review is therefore for 
correctness. Id. 
4. When a trial court sentences a defendant without seeking sentencing input 
from both defense counsel and the prosecutor, is the resultant sentence ipso facto a 
sentence based on unreliable information in violation of the defendant's due process 
rights? 
Issues of constitutional interpretation are issues of law. State v. Valencia, 2001 
UT App 159, f 9, 27 P.3d 573. Review is again for correctness. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following provision, set forth is addendum B, is relevant to this appeal: 
Rule 22, Utah R. Cnm. P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty to attempted unlawful possession of methamphetamine, a 
class A misdemeanor, and to unlawful possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, 
both in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000). R. 18-24,27-28. 
The court accepted defendant's guilty plea, informed him that sentencing was set for May 
26, 2000, and ordered him to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for 
preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI). R. 27-28. 
Defendant appeared at AP&P, and a PSI was prepared. R. 52. He did not, 
however, appear for sentencing. R. 29-32. He was not in custody, having been released 
on personal recognizance to pretrial services. R. 11. He had contacted neither his 
counsel nor the court, and defense counsel had been unable to locate him. R. 54:2-3. The 
sentencing court found that defendant had voluntarily absented himself from sentencing, 
sentenced him in absentia, revoked his release, and ordered issuance of a nonbailable 
arrest warrant. R. 30-31, 36. The trial court imposed a one-year prison term for 
attempted possession of methamphetamine and a concurrent six-month term for 
possession of marijuana. R. 54:3. 
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Defense counsel timely appealed. R. 39. When finally apprehended, defendant 
sent the trial court a letter acknowledging: "I do not have a legitimate excuse" for not 
appeanng at sentencing. R. 66 (emphasis in onginal). The court of appeals unanimously 
vacated defendant's sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. Id. at 
«J33. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement, a police officer observed defendant 
"rummaging through donated items at Deseret Industries" at 2120 South Highland Dnve 
in Salt Lake County. R. 6. When the officer saw defendant pick up and pocket 
something, he decided to stop defendant for theft. Id. A computer check revealed an 
outstanding warrant, and defendant was arrested. Id. In a search incident to the arrest, 
the police officer found a gas torch nozzle and nine small containers, three of them 
holding a crystal substance that defendant identified as methamphetamine. Id. The 
officer also located two pipes and five knives in defendant's pockets. Id. In a search 
later at the jail, "two more bags of suspected methamphetamine and a bag of suspected 
manjuana were found on defendant. R. 7. In his statement in support of his guilty plea, 
defendant admitted that he possessed manjuana. R. 19. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ignonng controlling precedent and sound policy, the court of appeals imposed an 
unreasonable burden of production on the State, effectively precluding the sentencing o( 
4 
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*no show*' defendants. The court's opinion reverses the established presumption that an 
absence is voluntary where the defendant has been notified of his sentencing hearing, but 
is absent without explanation. The decision conflicts with decisions on the same issue 
from this Court and from another panel of the court of appeals. 
Further, the court of appeals' opinion effectively forecloses the sentencing of 
absent defendants by requiring the State to make extensive, expensive, and time-
consuming investigational inquiries into the possible reasons for a defendant's absence. 
This aberrational requirement is inconsistent with Utah precedent, apparently without 
precedent in any other jurisdiction, and contrary to sound policy. 
The opinion also imposes a new affirmative duty on trial courts to solicit 
sentencing input from defense counsel and from prosecutors where they neither ask to 
present that information nor object to sentencing without it. This holding effectively 
requires the trial court to "coach" legal counsel and encourages invited error. 
The opinion further classifies a sentence imposed under these circumstances as i%a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner" subject to challenge at any time. This holding 
opens the floodgates to legal challenges of sentencing decisions based on mere 
speculation that (a) defense counsel or the prosecutor may have had information relevant 
to sentencing, but was too timid or poorly trained to request an opportunity to speak, and 
(t>) the information would likely have resulted in a more favorable sentence. 
;> 
Finally, the court of appeals' opinion holds that the sentence imposed in this case 
violated defendant's due process rights. Because the tnal court discussed defendant's 
absence, the court of appeals apparently presumed that the tnal court fixed its sentence 
considering only defendant's absence from sentencing. The record contained other 
evidence supporting the sentence, however, and the tnal court did not state the basis for 
its sentencing decision. Where the record is silent regarding the factors considered by the 
trial court, a reviewing court must accord a presumption of regularity to the proceedings 
of a tnal court. Ignoring controlling precedent, the court of appeals imposed the opposite 
presumption, i.e., a presumption of irregulanty. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
UNDER CONTROLLING AND SOUND PRECEDENT, A TRIAL 
COURT MAY PRESUME THAT A DEFENDANT WHO HAS BEEN 
NOTIFIED OF HIS SENTENCING HEARING, BUT FAILS TO 
APPEAR, IS VOLUNTARILY ABSENT; THE STATE NEED NOT 
SHOW THAT IT HAS SEARCHED FOR THE DEFENDANT 
The court of appeals held that "a tnal court may not assume a defendant's 
knowing absence is voluntary, but rather is required to determine whether a defendant's 
absence is in fact voluntary." Wanosik, UT App 241, «[ 19. The court further held that 
the State must make a "preliminary showing" that the defendant's absence is voluntary, 
suggesting that the State meet this "preliminary burden" by inquiry of law enforcement 
agencies, local hospitals, the defendant's emplover, pretnal services, and bail bond 
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companies, and by attempting to contact the defendant at his residence or other places the 
defendant is known to frequent. Id. at Ijlj 22-23. 
The court of appeals' holding contravenes precedent established by this Court and 
by another panel of the court of appeals. It imposes an aberrational and unworkable 
burden on the State. Further, as the court of appeals' opinion acknowledges, it is usually 
impossible to show "whether a defendant's absence is in fact voluntary." Id. at j^ 19. 
The court observes that, even following the extensive inquiries mandated by this opinion, 
voluntariness cannot be guarantied. Id. at <j23. 
The effect of the court of appeals' opinion is to change the burden of production 
established by precedent, requiring the State to engage in an expensive and time-
consuming investigation into the reasons for a defendant's absence before a defendant 
may be presumed involuntarily absent. The change mandated is inconsistent with sound 
policy where, as the court of appeals' opinion concedes, "the vast majority of court no-
shows" are, in fact, voluntary and where the judicial system provides adequate remedies 
for the "tiny minority" who might be involuntarily absent without explanation. Id. at 
«[20n.l0. 
A. Under controlling precedent a trial court may presume that a defendant who 
has been notified of his sentencing hearing, but fails to appear, is voluntarily 
absent 
A defendant is "knowingly" absent when he has received notice of a court 
proceeding, but does not appear. See Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241,«[ 19 n.8. Whether he 
i 
is "voluntarily" absent is another question. A defendant is "voluntarily" absent when he 
is free to attend but does not. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). 
A defendant is "involuntarily" absent if he cannot attend, for instance, because he is 
incarcerated and his jailers will not permit his attendance or because he is comatose 
following an accident. See State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986). 
Frequently, however, as in the present case, the trial court has no explanation for a 
defendant's absence. The defendant simply does not appear. Defendant has not 
contacted the court, his attorney, or the prosecutor—and neither has anyone else. 
Voluntariness or involuntariness cannot be guaranteed, and a presumption must therefore 
be made. 
While court of appeals' opinion recognizes the need for a rebuttable presumption 
of voluntariness, it shifts the point at which the presumption may be made. The court of 
appeals' decision permits the presumption only after "a preliminary showing" of 
voluntariness, i.e., after extensive investigation into a defendant's possible whereabouts, 
tn establishing this new point at which the presumption may be employed, the court of 
appeals'opinion contradicts established precedent. 
The court of appeals' opinion holds, in fact, that a defendant who, despite 
receiving notice, neither appears nor conveys a reason for his absence from sentencing 
must be presumed involuntarily absent. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241,1j 20 n. 10. That 
presumption obtains even though defense counsel is present, but unable to give an 
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explanation. Id. at f^ 20. This allocation of the burden of production conflicts with 
precedent established in State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996), and State v. 
Myers, 508 P.2d 41 (Utah 1973), decisions by this Court, and with State v. Wagstaff, 772 
P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1989), a decision by another panel of the court of appeals. 
The controlling case in this jurisdiction is Anderson. In Anderson, this Court held 
that a defendant is voluntarily absent when he receives notice of a hearing and is "free to 
attend" in the sense that he is "not incarcerated elsewhere." Id. at 1110. Observing that 
xAnderson did not argue on appeal that he had not been at liberty to attend, this Court 
upheld the trial court's determination that Anderson was voluntarily absent at sentencing. 
In other words, once the State had met its burden to show that Anderson had notice, the 
burden shifted to Anderson to present some reason for his absence.1 The Wanosik 
holding conflicts with this decision. 
In arriving at its decision in Anderson, this Court cited Wagstaff, a trial-in-absentia 
case, where the court of appeals laid out the test for voluntariness. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 
1110 (citing Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 990). The "[voluntariness [of a defendant's absence 
from his trial] is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances/' Id. at 990. 
Applying this test, the court of appeals held that Wagstaff—who had sufficient notice 
'Anderson, it turned out, did not have actual "official notice" of his sentencing 
hearing. 929 P.2d at 1110. Observing that Anderson had "severed contact" with his own 
attorney, the prosecution, and pretnal services, this Court held that notice was sufficient 
because Anderson "would have known of the sentencing date" had he maintained contact 
with his attorney and with pretnal services. Id. at 1111. 
9 
f 
through his attorney, who presented no reason for his absence at tnal, and who presented 
only an insufficient reason thereafter—was voluntanly absent. Id. 
Again, once the State had met its burden to demonstrate that Wagstaff had been 
given notice, the burden to present some sound reason for his absence shifted to 
Wagstaff. "A defendant must have a compelling reason to stay away from the tnal. If his 
absence is deliberate without a sound reason, the trial may start in his absence." Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Wanosik panel's presumption of 
involuntariness conflicts with the Wagstaff decision by another court of appeals' panel. 
The court of appeals' decision also conflicts with this Court's decision in Myers, 
508 P.2d at 41, an earlier trial-in-absentia case. Observing that Myers knew when trial 
would resume, this Court stated that Myers had 'Voluntarily and intentionally absconded." 
Id. Myers gave no reason for his absence, and this Court affirmed his conviction, holding 
that he had waived his nght to be present. Id. at 43. 
In sum, in Anderson, Wagstaff, and Myers, Utah appellate courts reviewed and 
affirmed trial court determinations that defendants had been voluntarily absent. The State 
was not required in any of these cases to make a preliminary showing of voluntariness by 
establishing that it had searched for the defendant at his residence, his place of 
employment, jails, and hospitals or made inqumes of bail bondsmen and pretnal sen ices. 
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1107; Wagstaff 111 P.2d at 987; Myers, 508 P.2d at 41.2 
:In State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986), this Court reversed a defendant's 
conviction, holding that the trial court had erred in finding the defendant voluntanly absent 
10 
Further, Utah's traditional allocation of the burden of production to a notified 
defendant is consistent with case law from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. 
Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that where defendant knew tnal date 
and where no evidence suggested an enforced absence, defendant "ha[d] the burden of 
going forward and offering evidence to refute the [voluntariness] finding of the tnal 
court"); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("When a defendant is 
free on bond and does not appear at the time specified, it is presumed, until established 
otherwise, that his absence is voluntary for the purpose of deciding whether he has 
waived his right to be present at trial."); Moore v State, 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Cnm. 
App. 1984) (en banc) ("Absent any evidence from the defendant to refute the tnal court's 
determination that his absence was voluntarv, we will not disturb the tnal court's 
finding."). 
Finally, the burden of production imposed by the court of appeals is aberrational. 
In its research, the State found no jurisdiction mandating extensive investigational 
inquines like those that the court of appeals' opinion requires to rebut a presumption of 
involuntariness. 
when his trial commenced. In that case, the prosecutor advised the tnal court that the 
defendant had been arrested in California for drunken dnving. The court nevertheless 
proceeded with the trial. While the prosecutor, rather than defendant or defense counsel, 
presented a legitimate reason for Houtz's absence, that case does not make the prosecutor, 
rather than the defendant, responsible for producing a reason. Rather, it stands for the 
proposition that when a reason has been presented, the tnal court must consider that reason 
in its voluntariness determination. 
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In sum, the court of appeals' decision is contrary to its own precedent and to 
precedent established by this Court. While voluntariness is determined from the totality 
of the circumstances and the State has the burden of proving voluntariness, voluntariness 
may be inferred from evidence that a defendant received notice. Once the State has 
demonstrated adequate notice, a defendant has the burden of presenting at least some 
sound reason for his absence.3 The court of appeals' opinion improperly reverses the 
presumption and reallocates the burden of going forward. 
B. As a matter of sound policy, Utah should retain its current presumption of 
voluntariness and reject the court of appeals' aberrational and unworkable 
new rule. 
The court of appeals apparently imposed its presumption of involuntariness and its 
rebuttal requirements in an attempt to minimize the possibility that a defendant might be 
sentenced in absentia when external circumstances prevented his attendance. The court 
acknowledged, however, that most "no-show" defendants "got sidetracked in some 
volitional way" and that "only a tiny minority find themselves comatose or otherwise 
involuntarily incapacitated at the time of trial or sentencing." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 41, 
*Utah appellate courts have implicitly held that their review of a tnal court's 
voluntariness finding may extend to evidence developed subsequent to the trial court's ruling, 
so long as the defendant gives the trial court an opportunity to consider the new evidence. 
See State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 988-989 (reviewing affidavit filed with motion for a new 
tnal eight months after tnal in absentia); State v. Coles, 688 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1984) 
(reviewing evidence that defendant's absence was due to a mistake of counsel proffered 
dunng arguments on motion to set aside judgment). 
12 
*! 20 n.10. The court therefore imposed this heavy burden for the benefit of that "tiny 
minority." 
That benefit does not justify the onerous burden of production imposed. Failure to 
appear is all too common injudicial proceedings. During the time approximately 
concurrent with the progress of this appeal through the appellate system, the State has 
addressed at least eight other cases appealing sentencing-in-absentia proceedings.4 This 
number does not, of course, include sentencing-in-absentia cases where no appeal was 
filed. The cases generally involve convictions for non-violent crimes such as drug 
possession. The defendants have generally been released on bail or to the supervision of 
pretrial services because they do not pose an unusual danger to the community. 
In view of the large number of cases and the nature of the underlying offenses, the 
likelihood that county prosecutors will divert their limited resources to the investigational 
inquiries required by the court of appeals seems small. Rather, sentencing will occur only 
if and when the defendants are arrested pursuant to outstanding warrants. Further, even 
though a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has entered a guilty plea, judgments 
4See State v. Wheeler, 2001 UT App 276 (memorandum decision) (addendum C); 
State v. Handing, 2001 UT App 267 (memorandum decision) (addendum C); State v. Rogers, 
20000812-CA (order dismissing appeal filed Jan. 29, 2002); State v. Vicente, 2002 UT App 
43 (memorandum decision) (addendum C); State v. Gardner, 2001 UT App 335 
(memorandum decision) (addendumC); State v. Wilkensen, 2000 UT App 383 (memorandum 
decision) (addendum C); State v. Payne, 2001 UT App 242 (memorandum decision) 
(addendum C); and State v. Bird, 2001 UT App 333 (memorandum decision) (addendum C). 
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and convictions, which are usually entered at sentencing, will not be entered until after 
defendants are arrested." 
The effect will be to allow a "mischievously inclined defendant to profit by his 
own wrongdoing" and by "devious and cunning ways" to "render[] helpless and 
impotent" the administration of justice by the courts. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 
(quoting Myers, 508 P.2d at 42-43). A defendant might "possibly absent himself for 
years," complicating sentencing decisions when he is finally apprehended. Id. 
Further, the effect may be to chill the willingness of judges to release defendants 
awaiting sentencing. This would be unfair to defendants who would not abscond. See id. 
These are the very results that this Court addressed in reaching the decisions that the court 
of appeals now ignores. 
Finally, the judicial system already provides adequate remedies for the "tiny 
minority" of defendants who may be sentenced while involuntarily absent. Sentencing 
judges often express their willingness to reopen sentencing if, following sentencing, the 
defendant approaches the court with a reason for his absence. For example, the trial 
judge told defense counsel in this case, if defendant "is in touch with you or shows up 
before he's arrested, then you may approach me." R. 54:3. Even without that 
"Failure to timely enter a conviction and judgment may have unanticipated collateral 
consequences. For instance, a court cannot enter a probation order restricting the possession 
of weapon by the perpetrator of a domestic violence offense until after a conviction is 
entered. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-5.1 (1995). Similarly, until a bnbery conviction is 
entered, it cannot be used to impeach a defendant at a subsequent trial. See Utah R. Evid. 
609(a)(2). 
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willingness, however, a defendant has several avenues to challenge his sentencing He 
may file a motion to set aside the sentence, appeal, or file an action for post-conviction 
relief See, e g , State x Coles, 688 P 2d 473, 473-4^4 (Ltah 1984) (remand for new trial 
where absent defendant later demonstrated absence was due to mistake of counsel) * 
This Court should determine, as a matter of policy, that the law, as it existed before 
Wanosik, appropnately presumes voluntanness where a defendant has been notified of his 
sentencing heanng, but is absent without explanation, and that it properly allocates to the 
defendant the burden to present a reason for his absence following notice. Defendant in 
this case, like "the vast majonty of court no-shows," "[did] not have a legitimate excuse 
for not appeanng for sentencing." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, «[20 n 10 & ^  26 A 
presumption of voluntanness will not leave the tiny minonty of "no-shows," who may be 
sentenced despite an involuntary absence, without remedy. 
II. 
RULE 22(a) DOES NOT REQUIRE A TRIAL COURT TO 
AFFIRMATIVELY SEEK SENTENCING INPUT FROM DEFENSE 
COUNSEL AND THE PROSECUTOR, EVEN WITHOUT A REQUEST 
OR OBJECTION 
The court of appeals held that the tnal court violated Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of 
Cnminal Procedure, because it did not meet its "affirmative obligation to extend the 
bThe court of appeals' decision does not question the adequacy of these remedies tor 
defendants who are involuntanly absent, but mav not be found despite the extensive 
investigational mquines required of the State 
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opportunity to be heard" to defense counsel and to the prosecution. Wanosik. 2001 I T 
App 241, Iffi 30-32. The court of appeals misapprehended the rule's reach. 
Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in part: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should 
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity 
to present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
Rule 22(a) requires that the trial court afford a defendant the opportunity to 
address the court prior to sentencing. The rule, much like the common law right of 
allocution, "contemplates permitting a convicted defendant to speak prior to the fixing of 
sentence in order to provide the defendant a chance to present a plea in mitigation;' State 
v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 372 (Utah 1993) (opinion of Durham, J., joined in the result and 
apparently in the analysis of this issue by Zimmerman & Stewart, JJ.). By statute, "courts 
must permit allocution at the sentencing phase, when requested/' Id. 
The court of appeals has pointed to no precedent suggesting that rule 22(a) 
requires a court to affirmatively extend an invitation to speak to a defendant, much less to 
his counsel or to the prosecution. This court has held that "[t]he failure of the trial court 
to ask a defendant, represented by an attorney, whether he has anything to say before 
sentence is imposed (allocution), does not in itself constitute constitutional error." State 
v. Kelbac/h 461 P.2d 297, 299 (Utah 1969), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 
935 (1972). Further, while this Court has not determined whether the failure of a trial 
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court to ask a defendant whether he has anything to say violates rule 22(a), it has 
suggested that such failure does not of itself violate the rule. "[Cjourts must permit 
allocution at the sentencing phase, when requested" State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 372 
(emphasis added). 
Even were this Court to require trial courts to affirmatively offer defendants an 
opportunity to speak prior to sentencing, it would not necessarily follow that trial courts 
must, as the court of appeals opined, "afford a voluntarily absent defendant the 
opportunity to exercise his rule 22(a) rights through counsel," i.e., affirmatively invite 
defense counsel to speak. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, «[ 30. Nor would the policy 
considerations that might favor an express invitation to a defendant similarly favor an 
express invitation to defense counsel. 
Judicial interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, while not 
controlling here, is instructive. Federal rule 32(c)(3) requires a sentencing court to 
• "afford defendant's counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the 
defendant," and 
• "address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant 
wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
the sentence." 
Interpreting this rule, the Fifth Circuit held that "the burden rests with the court to make 
sure the defendant understands that he has the neht to sav anvthing he wants before the 
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sentence imposed." United States v. Vasquez. 216 F.3d 456, 458-459 (5th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 531 U.S. 972 (2000). In other words, the trial court must extend an affirmative 
invitation to the defendant to speak. A defendant need not make a request. But, with 
respect to affording a right to defense counsel to speak, "the court does not have the same 
burdens . . . as it does personally with the defendant. Consequently, it follows defense 
counsel should bear the burden of objecting if no opportunity is afforded." Id. at 458. 
The Fifth Circuit made the reasons for this distinction clear. "The court is 
confident that competent members of the bar will speak up during a sentencing hearing on 
behalf of their clients when counsel has a matter they would like to bring to the court's 
attention." Id. Because a defendant may not know that he has a right to speak out on any 
subject of his choosing prior to sentencing, the court must make sure that the defendant 
understands. Id. "There is no need for this rationale to be applied to counsel's nght to 
speak, since attorneys already know they have a right to speak on behalf of their clients." 
Id. at 459. 
As a matter of policy, it makes little difference whether defendant is or is not 
present. Attorneys know they have a right to speak in behalf of their clients. If they have 
mitigating information to proffer, they need only request the opportunity to present it. 
Should sentencing proceed with no opportunity to present such information, they can 
object. 
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Further, placing the onus on the trial court to solicit sentencing information from 
both defense counsel and the prosecutor may encourage invited error. Defense counsel 
having only penpherally important information to offer, for instance, could silently permit 
the trial court to proceed with sentencing, "preview" the sentence, and, if not satisfied, 
appeal, claiming that the trial court did not invite their input. 
Finally, requiring the trial court to solicit sentencing information from defense 
counsel and the prosecutor, who are both competent to request the opportunity when 
desired, may lead to absurd results. That possibility is suggested by the court of appeals 
memorandum opinion in Stare v. Handing, 2001 UT App 267 (addendum C), where the 
court of appeals applied the Wanosik rationale to vacate Hamling's sentence. Observing 
that the trial court had given defense counsel the opportunity to provide sentencing 
information in the defendant's behalf, the court of appeals nevertheless directed that 
"[u]pon remand, sentencing must be in accordance with the procedures set forth in 
Wanosik. Such procedure includes giving both the defense and the prosecution the 
opportunity to make a statement prior to sentencing." Id. (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted). Apparently, the court's failure to ask a prosecutor for information—which 
might in many cases result in a list of aggravating, rather than mitigating 
factors—constitutes error a defendant may claim under Wanosik. 
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In sum, while it may be sound judicial practice for a judge to ask both defense 
counsel and the prosecutor whether they have information relevant to sentencing, this 
Court should decline to impose an affirmative duty to inquire under rule 22(a). 
HI. 
A SENTENCE IS NOT "IMPOSED IN AN ILLEGAL MANNER" FOR 
PURPOSES OF RULE 22(e) SIMPLY BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
FAILS TO AFFIRMATIVELY SOLICIT SENTENCING INPUT FROM 
DEFENSE COUNSEL OR FROM THE PROSECUTOR 
In a footnote to its opinion, the court of appeals rejected the State's claim that 
"Wanosik must show plain error with regard to his rule 22(a) claim because he did not 
preserve the claim below." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, *f 28 n.l 1. The court of appeals 
then observed "that rule 22(e) [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] permits the 
court of appeals to consider the legality of a sentence even if the issue is raised for the 
first time on appeal." Id. This observation constitutes an implicit holding that a trial 
court imposes an illegal sentence when it sentences an absent defendant without soliciting 
input from both defense counsel and the prosecutor.7 Assuming, but not conceding, that a 
trial court errs when it imposes sentence without soliciting such input, the resultant 
sentence is not therefore an illegal sentence subject to challenge at any time. 
The court of appeals clearly reads Wanosik to hold that a sentence so imposed is an 
illegal sentence. See State v. Samora, 2001 UT App 266, at n.l (memorandum opinion) 
(defendant "could challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22(e)") (addendum C); 
State v. Handing, 2001 UT App 267 (memorandum opinion) (same) (addendum C); State v. 
Gardner, 2001 UT App 335 (memorandum opinion) ("sentence was imposed in an illegal 
manner") (addendum C); State v. Vicente, 2002 I T App 43, at n.l (memorandum opinion) 
(defendant "could challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22(e)") (addendum C). 
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Rule 22(e), Utah R. Cnm. P., provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal 
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."8 The rule codified 
precedent established by Utah courts permitting review of sentences so "obviously 
illegal" that "it would . . . be unconscionable not to examine the issue." See Rammell v. 
Smitlu 560 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 1977). These included sentences imposed by a court 
having no jurisdiction, sentences not authorized by law, and sentences "of an entirely 
different character than that which the statute prescribes." Id. 
Since 1980, Utah courts have held or reasoned that illegal sentences may occur in 
the following circumstances: 
• The sentence provides a punishment that does not conform to the statutes 
governing the crime of conviction. See State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 
545, 551 (Utah 1996) (statute %"d[id] not authorize a consecutive, 
determinate two-year [enhancement] term"); State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 
(Utah 1991), 86-88 (sentence to indeterminate term was illegal and void 
where statute mandated minimum mandatory sentence; corrected sentence 
was lawful, even though harsher); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389-90 
(Utah 1988) (sentence to indeterminate term with recommended maximum 
'Rule 22(e) was enacted as statute in 1980 and codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-
22(e). See 1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, § 1. As with other statutory rules of procedure and 
evidence contained in the code, rule 22(e) was repealed as statute and adopted as a court rule 
in 1990. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35 (repealed) (1999 Replacement Part); Compiler's Notes. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (2001). 
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was illegal where statute requires a minimum mandatory term); State v. 
Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, <j<j 6, 14, 14 P.3d 129 (under statute in effect at 
the time of sentencing, trial court should have sentenced for misdemeanors, 
not felonies); State v. Schweitzer\ 943 P.2d 649, 653-654 (Utah App. 1997) 
(statute did not authorize trial court order that defendant's property be sold 
to satisfy restitution); State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 
1996) (statute "d[id] not empower the trial court to impose a determinate 
sentence exceeding one year"); State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 992-993 
(Utah App. 1994) (one-year jail sentence would be illegal where statute 
mandated indeterminate one-to-fifteen year term). 
• The sentence is ambiguous. See Parry v. State, 837 P.2d 998, 999 (Utah 
App. 1992) (judge's oral pronouncement referred to "aggravated burglary, a 
third degree felony," where statute treated aggravated burglary as a first 
degree felony). 
• The trial court lacks jurisdiction. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1168 
(Utah App. 1997) (trial court lacked junsdiction to revoke probation where 
defendant was not charged with probation violation within his original 
probation term). 
Utah courts have also held or reasoned that alleged errors do not constitute illegal 
sentences in the following circumstances: 
~>~> 
The defendant challenges the conviction, not the sentence. See State v. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, If 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (merger claim was challenge to 
conviction, not to sentence; review under rule 22(e) was error); State v. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-860 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address 
defendant's argument that 'his convictions for robbery and burglary 
illegally punish[ed] him twice for the same crime/' appellate court stated 
that it could not "review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(Q) when the 
substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to 
the underlying conviction"); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 
1991) (argument that defendant was convicted for conduct prohibited both 
by arson and aggravated arson statutes was not a challenge to the imposition 
of an incorrect and therefore void sentence and could not be raised for the 
first time on appeal); see also State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah 
1994) (argument that mens rea for second degree murder and manslaughter 
did not differ and that defendant should have been sentenced to the lesser 
manslaughter penalty was not a challenge to an illegal sentence that could 
be corrected at any time under rule 22(e)). 
The trial court bases its sentencing on inappropriate factors. State v. 
Wareham, 801 P.2d918, 919-920 & n.2 (Utah 1990) (defendant asserted 
that sentencing enhancement was based on aggravating factors committed 
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prior to the date of the enhancement statute and therefore in violation of ex 
post facto protections; court held that issue should have been raised on 
appeal and any error would not render sentence illegal under rule 22(e)).Q 
Defendant's claimed error does not constitute an illegal sentence under Utah law. 
His sentence is not similar to those Utah courts have declared illegal. The tnal court did 
not impose a statutorily unauthorized sentence. The sentence was not ambiguous. 
Jurisdiction was not lacking. 
At most, defense counsel and/or the prosecution may have had additional 
information relevant to sentencing that may have favorably influenced defendant's 
sentence. Thus, the alleged error is certainly of no greater import than the error alleged in 
Wareham, i.e., sentencing on the basis of inappropriate factors. 
Wareham's analysis therefore appears to control here. An allegation that a 
sentencing decision may not have been fully informed (Wanosik) should not render a 
sentence illegal if a sentence actually based on inappropriate factors (Wareham) is not 
illegal. If error occurred in the trial court, it did not render the sentence illegal and 
subject to challenge at any time. Error, if any, is subject to appeal, but only via the 
normal channels of appellate review. A defendant claiming that a trial court erred by 
failing to solicit sentencing input from defense counsel and from the prosecution must 
"But cf. State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45,^6 n.1,975 P.2d 476 (stating in dicta that 
ex post facto claim based on resentencing after completion of onginal sentence and voluntary 
withdrawal of plea would be proper under rule 22(e)). 
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therefore preserve that claim below or demonstrate plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. Defendant did not, and the court of appeals erred in addressing 
his claim as if it constituted a challenge to an illegal sentence. 
Further, as a matter of policy, this court should not treat defendant's alleged error 
as an illegal sentence. In determining what kinds of errors constitute illegal sentences, 
courts must attempt to ''balance the need for the finality of convictions and sentences with 
the goal of ensuring that criminal defendants do not serve sentences imposed contrary to 
the requirements of law/' Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 2001); see also 
State v. Murray, 744 A.2d 131, 134 (N.J. 2000).l,) 
Several consequences attach to the classification of a sentencing error as an illegal 
sentence. First, an illegal sentence is reviewable at any time, a characteristic affecting the 
!0Florida and New Jersey courts have systematically addressed the definition of illegal 
sentences. Florida courts have defined an "illegal sentence" as a sentence that "imposes a 
kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly 
inflict under any set of factual circumstances." Carter, 786 So.2d at 1181. Examples include 
sentences that exceed the maximum statutory period for a particular offense or that fail to 
credit a defendant with jail time served. Id. A sentence is not illegal simply because it 
encompasses a "patent sentencing error[]." Id. 
In New Jersey, a sentence "in excess of or otherwise not in accordance" with statutory 
mandates is illegal. Murray, 744 A.2d at 134. A sentence may also be illegal where "it was 
not imposed in accordance with law." Id. at 135. A sentence may fail, for instance, to satisfy 
required statutory presentencing conditions and, as a result, its imposition would not be in 
accordance with law. Id. In New Jersey, where statute prohibits the confinement of a 
defendant in a youth correctional facility after he has served a prison sentence, sentencing 
to a youth facility can constitute a sentence "not imposed in accordance with law." Id. 
Likewise, where statutory law mandates a term of parole ineligibility, a sentence that fails 
to include that term is "not imposed in accordance with law." Id. 
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finality of judgments. See Utah R. Cnm. P. 22(e). Further, because an illegal sentence is 
a void sentence, a new sentence imposed after vacation of an illegal sentence is not 
restricted by the terms of the illegal sentence and may be harsher. See BabbeL 813 P.2d 
at 88. Indeed, the State (not just the defendant) may seek vacation of an illegal sentence. 
The State may claim, for instance, that the punishment imposed is less severe than the 
punishment statutorily mandated. See id. at 86. In light of these factors, courts have 
carefully restricted the kinds of sentencing errors that may render a sentence illegal. 
Under Utah law, a rule 22(e) illegal sentence is a "sentence that does not conform 
to the crime of which the defendant has been convicted" or a sentence "imposed in an 
illegal manner." State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1043 n.2 (Utah App. 1994). It is a 
"patently" or "facially illegal" sentence. See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860 ("patently illegal"); 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654 ("patently illegal"); see also Edwards v. State, 918 P.2d 321, 
324 (Nev. 1996) ("facially illegal"); Commonwealth v. Harrison, 661 A.2d 6, 8 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1995) ("patently illegal"). In other words, the sentence's illegality will usually 
be apparent upon review of the relevant statutes, the conviction, and the sentence 
itself—without recourse to other portions of the record—because the terms and 
conditions of the punishment for that offense are impermissible as a matter of law. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not solicit input from counsel before 
rendering its decision. Defendant did not preserve his claim by objecting to the alleged 
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error. The court of appeals, however, reviewed the claimed error, holding that defendant 
could assert his unpreserved claim under rule 22(e) as a challenge to an illegal sentence. 
The court of appeals erred. Should this Court affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, it would expand the definition of "an illegal sentence" or "a sentence imposed in 
an illegal manner" to encompass a wide range of sentencing errors previously subject to 
the requirements of ordinary appellate review. Should this Court determine that the 
district court imposed an illegal sentence by sentencing defendant without first 
affirmatively soliciting input from defense counsel and the prosecution, that decision 
would open the door to multitudinous claims of such error, raisable "at any time." 
Further, it would open the door to claims by the State that trial courts have erred in 
imposing sentences that are too lenient because the court has not invited the prosecutor to 
comment. 
The issue here is appropriate for review under ordinary appellate procedures, not 
for correction under rule 22(e). Alleged error of this kind is not patently in violation of 
statute. It is not the kind of error that has traditionally merited review as a possibly illegal 
sentence. This court of appeals erred in holding that the alleged error in this case is 
reviewable under rule 22(e). 
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IV. 
DUE PROCESS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
AFFIRMATIVELY SOLICIT SENTENCING INPUT FROM 
COUNSEL; DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE WAS BASED ON RELIABLE 
AND RELEVANT INFORMATION 
The court of appeals held that "Wanosik's Due Process rights were compromised 
by the trial court's failure to base its sentencing decision on relevant and reliable 
information regarding the crime, Wanosik's background, and the interests of society." 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, % 36. The court of appeals apparently concluded that the 
failure to (a) solicit information from defense counsel and the prosecution and (b) 
articulate the bases for the sentencing decision suggested that the sentence was imposed 
solely because of Wanosik's failure to appear. See id. at f^ f 34-36. The court of appeals 
erred in both respects. 
A. Due process does not require that the trial court affirmatively solicit 
sentencing input from either defense counsel or the prosecution. 
A defendant has a due process right to sentencing based on relevant and reliable 
information. State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). Due process, however, 
does not require that the trial court affirmatively solicit sentencing input from either 
defense counsel or the prosecution. This Court has previously ruled that Wk[t]he failure of 
the trial court to ask a defendant, represented by an attorney, whether he has anything to 
say before sentence is imposed (allocution), does not in itself constitute constitutional 
error." Kelbach, 461 P.2d at 299. If the failure to solicit allocution from a defendant in 
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attendance does not violate constitutional protections, a fortiori the failure to solicit 
sentencing input from defense counsel in a defendant's absence cannot be constitutional 
error. Likewise, failure to solicit input from the prosecutor, who does not represent 
defendant, cannot violate a defendant's due process rights. 
B. The court of appeals ignored relevant and reliable record evidence supporting 
the trial court's sentence and disregarded the presumption of regularity 
properly accorded to proceedings of the trial court. 
The court of appeals stated that i4[t]he record in this case fails to disclose any 
relevant or reliable information, other than the fact that defendant was absent from the 
proceeding, relied on by the trial court in imposing maximum—albeit 
concurrent—sentences for both crimes." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, % 30. Further, the 
court observed, "From all that appears in the record, however, Wanosik's absence at 
sentencing was the only information considered by the trial court in deciding what 
sentences to impose/' Id. In arriving at this conclusion, the court of appeals disregarded 
other record evidence upon which the trial court may have relied and disregarded the 
presumption of regularity usually accorded to proceedings of a trial court. 
•1. The court of appeals disregarded relevant and reliable record evidence 
supporting the trial court's sentence. 
The trial court had before it the record in this case. In addition to the minutes of 
defendant's plea-taking and his plea statement, both indicating the nature of defendant's 
convictions, the record included the information charging defendant. R. 5-7, 18-24, 27-
28. The probable cause statement indicated that an officer had discovered defendant in an 
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apparent act of theft. R. 6. The officer detained defendant, discovered an outstanding 
warrant, arrested defendant, and conducted a search incident to the arrest. Id. During the 
search, the officer found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. R. 6-7. 
Further, he found that defendant was carrying five knives. R. 7. The record also 
indicated that the trial court had caused another arrest warrant to issue following the filing 
of the information because it found "reasonable grounds to believe defendant [would] not 
appear on a summons." R. 1. 
Additionally, a PSI had been prepared. PSI (R. 52); see also R. 54:2. The PSI 
recounted the contents of the probable cause statement and also indicated an extensive 
history of criminal offenses. R. 52:2, 4. 
While the PSI investigator recommended a twenty-day jail term followed by 
probation, his summary included the following statements: "[T]he present offense is 
[defendant's] fifth misdemeanant arrest. He has some substance abuse history but denies 
involvement with drugs at this time. Obviously Mr. Wanosik was less than completely 
truthful about his abuse history." Id. at 9. The summary also noted that defendant's 
"conviction for retail theft was sent to warrants six times." Id. at 10. 
Based on the information in the PSI and in other parts of the record, the trial court 
could reasonably have determined that defendant was not a good candidate for probation. 
Defendant's criminal history, his drug abuse, his denial of a drug problem, his past 
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repeated failures to appear, and the facts of the instant offense are all relevant and reliable 
factors upon which the tnal court could have based its sentence.11 
2. The court of appeals disregarded the presumption of regularity properly 
accorded to proceedings of the trial court. 
Discussion at the sentencing hearing focused on defendant's absence. See R. 54. 
The court of appeals therefore presumed that the trial court considered only defendant's 
absence when it imposed "maximum—albeit concurrent—sentences" for defendant's two 
drug convictions. See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^ 34-36. That presumption 
contravened legal precedent that accords a "presumption of regularity" to proceedings o( 
the tnal court. See State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985) (where record was 
silent as to why motion was denied, reviewing court does not assume either error or 
prejudice); State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983) ("[i]n the absence of record 
evidence to the contrary, we assume regulanty in the proceedings below"); State i\ Scott, 
447 P.2d 908, 910-911 (Utah 1968) (where record is not clear as to what happened, *'[w]e 
must presume that the proceedings in the court were conducted according to law"). 
The trial judge in this case did not state that he was fixing sentence based solely on 
defendant's absence. See R. 54. While he did not refer to record documents or to any 
specific evidence upon which he relied at sentencing, absent evidence to the contrary, the 
"A tnal court abuses its discretion in fixing a sentence "only if it can be said that no 
reasonable man would take the view adopted by the tnal court." State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 
885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
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court of appeals should have presumed that he relied on all the relevant information 
before him. 
This Court has held, in the context of consecutive sentences, where consideration 
of certain enumerated statutory factors is mandatory, that "the trial court's silence, by 
itself" does not "presuppose[] that the court did not consider the proper factors as 
required by law. To do so would trample on the deference this court usually gives to the 
sentencing decisions of a trial court." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, If 11, 40 P.3d 626.!: If 
it is proper to assume that a trial court considered all relevant factors in imposing 
consecutive sentences, it seems at least equally proper to assume that a trial court 
considered all relevant factors in imposing concurrent sentences. 
In sum, record evidence sufficed to support the imposition of maximum concurrent 
terms. Nothing suggests that the trial court disregarded this relevant information and 
imposed sentence based solely on defendant's failure to appear. The court of appeals' 
decision disregards the record evidence and fails to accord a "presumption of regularity" 
to the trial court's sentencing proceedings. 
!2The Court suggested three exceptions to this rule: "where (1) an ambiguity of facts 
makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly provides that vvntten findings 
must be made, or (3) a prior case states that findings on an issue must be made." Helms. 
2002 UT 12, <f 11. No statutory or case law requires explicit findings for the imposition of 
concurrent terms in this case. Further, no ambiguity of facts makes the assumption 
unreasonable in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals and affirm defendant's district court 
conviction. 
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Defendant who pleaded guilty to drug charges in the 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis 
Frederick, J., and was sentenced in absentia. 
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme. J., 
held that: (1) defendant was not entitled to explicit 
warning that, even if defendant were absent, the court 
might proceed with sentencing; (2) sentencing court 
was required to inquire into defendant's ability to 
appear at sentencing proceeding, and State was 
required to make preliminary showing of 
voluntariness of defendant's absence, before 
sentencing court could decide that defendant had 
waived his right to be present; (3) sentencing court's 
failure to properly inquire into whether defendant's 
absence at sentencing hearing was voluntary was 
harmless error: and (4) sentencing court's failure to 
hear evidence from prosecutor and defense counsel at 
sentencing hearing was not harmless error. 
Vacated and remanded. 
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Before JACKSON. Associate Presiding Judge. 
ORME and THORNE. Judges. 
OPINION 
ORME. Judge: 
*! 1 Defendant Anthony James Wanosik appeals the 
sentences imposed by the trial court pursuant to his 
guilty pleas to attempted unlawful possession or use 
of a controlled substance and unlawful possession or 
use of a controlled substance, class A and B 
misdemeanors, respectively, each in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2000). We 
vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing. 
BACKGROUND 
*! 2 The facts are undisputed. Wanosik pled guilty to 
two misdemeanor drug offenses. At the plea hearing, 
the trial court told Wanosik that sentencing would be 
held on May 26, 2000, at 8:30 a.m.. and ordered 
Wanosik to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP 
& P) for preparation of a presentence report. The trial 
court did not specifically inform Wanosik that he 
could be sentenced in absentia if he failed to appear 
for sentencing. 
<| 3 Wanosik reported to AP & P. and a presentence 
report was completed. AP & P recommended that 
Wanosik be sentenced to twenty days in jail with 
credit for time served and that he then be committed 
to a substance abuse treatment program. 
*! 4 A sentencing hearing was held as scheduled on 
May 26. 2000. Wanosik was represented at the 
hearing by counsel but did not appear personally at 
the hearing or at any other time that morning. 
c
 5 Defense counsel expressed to the court her belief 
that Wanosik had intended to appear for sentencing 
but had perhaps written down the wrong date. 
Defense counsel asked the court to wait before 
issuing an arrest warrant to give counsel time to 
locate Wanosik. The court denied defense counsel's 
request and proceeded to impose sentence: 
[G]iven [Wanosik's] failure to appear I will 
terminate his pre-trial release, issue a warrant for 
his arrest returnable forthwith no bail. My 
inclination is to sentence him today, and I 
recognize you would prefer that I did not. but I 
am inclined to do so. It is curious that he has 
failed to appear today, although I can onl\ 
assume because he has not been in touch with >oir 
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nor has he been in touch with my court that he 
has chosen to voluntarily absent himself from 
these proceedings. 
Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of 
this Court that he serve the term provided by law 
in the adult detention center of one year for the 
class A misdemeanor crime of attempted 
possession of a controlled substance, and six 
months for the possession of a controlled 
substance, a misdemeanor charge to which he has 
pled guilty. I will order that those terms be 
served concurrently and not consecutively, and 
that they be imposed forthwith. 
Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you 
or shows up before he's arrested, then you may 
approach me, but in the meantime, Mr. 
D'Alesandro, you prepare the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order determining 
voluntary absent compliance, and that will be the 
order. 
Defense counsel promptly objected: 
MS. GARLAND: Judge, I would object to that 
order because I don't think that it takes into 
account his due process rights or his rights 
about— 
THE COURT: Right 
MS. GARLAND: However, I realize that's your 
order. 
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. I'll 
grant him credit for the eight days he served 
awaiting imposition or a resolution. 
The hearing was then immediately concluded. The 
prosecutor, Mr. D'Alesandro, was present but made 
no statement during the sentencing hearing, and the 
court addressed the prosecutor only to direct him to 
prepare the court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
^ 6 On June 14, 2000, Wanosik, through counsel, 
filed a timely notice of appeal of the sentences 
imposed in his absence. Wanosik was arrested a few 
months later on the warrant issued at the sentencing. 
After his arrest, *620 Wanosik sent a brief 
handwritten letter to the trial court in which he 
forthrightly acknowledged, with his own emphasis: 
"I do not have a legitimate excuse" for being absent at 
sentencing. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
c
 7 Wanosik makes two general claims on appeal: 
(1) that sentencing should not have proceeded in his 
absence: and (2) that even if sentencing him in 
absentia was proper, the trial court erred by the 
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manner in which it conducted sentencing. 
«1 8 Under Wranosik's first general claim i.e., that 
sentencing should not have proceeded in his absence, 
we address several distinct issues. First, we address 
Wanosik's contention that, as a matter of law, a 
defendant's absence at sentencing cannot be deemed 
voluntary if the defendant was not warned that 
sentencing could proceed in his voluntary absence. 
This contention presents a purely legal question, 
which we review for correctness. See State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Second, we 
address Wanosik's argument that even if a defendant's 
absence is properly deemed voluntary, the trial court 
may not proceed with sentencing without first 
balancing society's interest m proceeding and the 
defendant's interest in being present. This argument 
also presents a question of law, which we review for 
correctness. See id. Third, we believe that sound 
analysis requires us to address whether, in this case. 
the trial court's inquiry regarding the voluntariness of 
Wanosik's absence was properly conducted. 
Specifically, we address the questions of what type of 
inquiry is required of the trial court in making the 
factual determination of voluntariness; who has the 
burden of proving voluntariness; and what type of 
evidence may suffice to meet that burden. These are 
all legal questions, which, again, we review for 
correctness. See id. Finally, we conclude this first 
section of die opinion by considering whether any 
error by the trial court was harmless. 
<! 9 Wanosik's second claim is that, even assuming 
proceeding with sentencing in his absence was 
appropriate, "[t]he trial court violated due process 
and Utah R.Cnm. P. 22[ (a) ] when it sentenced 
[Wanosik] without considering relevant and reliable 
information and without affording defense counsel or 
the prosecutor the opportunity to speak at 
sentencing." These assertions require us to interpret 
both the mandates of Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and the requirements of Due 
Process at sentencing. Each of these inquiries pose 
questions of law. which we review for correctness. 
granting no particular deference to the conclusions of 
the trial court. See Brown v Glover, 2000 I T 89. c 
15. 16 P.3d 540 (M[T]he interpretation of a rule of 
procedure is a question of law that we review for 
correctness."); State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 15^, 
c
 9, 27 P.3d 5^3 ("Issues of constitutional 
interpretation are questions of law, which we review 
for correctness."). 
I. Sentencing in Absentia 
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[1][2][3] «! 10 We begin by addressing Wanosik's 
claim that the trial court erred by sentencing him in 
his absence. A criminal defendant's right to be 
present at all stages of trial includes the right to be 
present at sentencing. See State v. Anderson. 929 
P.2d 1107, 1109-11 (Utah 1996). "To intentionally 
relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must 
have notice of the proceedings." Id. at 1110. See 
Utah R.Cnm. P. 17(a)(2), 22(b). "However, this nght 
may be waived ... [by] the [defendant's] voluntary 
absence from [sentencing]. This waiver must be 
voluntary and involve an intentional relinquishment 
of a known right." State v. Wagstaff, 111 P.2d 987, 
989-90 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citations omitted). 
[FN1] 
FN1. Wagstafl involved a defendant's 
absence from tnal rather than from 
sentencing. See 111 P.2d at 988-89. The 
Utah Supreme Court, however, has 
previously relied on both Wagstafj and State 
v Houtz, 714 P 2d 677 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam), another Utah case involving a 
defendant's absence at trial, in addressing a 
criminal defendant's right to be present at 
sentencing. See State v. Anderson, 929 
P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (citing 
Wagstaff, 111 P.2d at 990; Houtz, 714 P.2d 
at 678). Likewise, the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure treat identically a 
defendant's right to be present at trial and a 
defendant's right to be present at sentencing. 
See Utah R.Cnm. P. 22(b). We therefore 
see no basis on which to distinguish 
between trial and sentencing in our analysis 
of a defendant's right to be present and a 
defendant's voluntary waiver of that right. 
*621 A. Specific Warning of Consequences 
[4] «[ 11 Notwithstanding that the Utah case law and 
rules referred to above appear to require only notice 
to defendant of the proceedings and of the right to be 
present in order to permit die court to proceed to a 
determination whether a defendant's voluntary 
absence is a waiver of the nght to be present, 
Wanosik argues that a further warning is required. 
Specifically, Wranosik argues he was entitled to be 
warned that the court might proceed with sentencing 
if he were to be voluntarily absent. [FN2] We 
disagree. 
FN2. Wanosik references both the Utah 
Constitution and the United States 
Constitution as well as the Utah Rules of 
'Criminal Procedure in making this 
argument. However, 
[n]o argument has been made as to wh>. 
ifwe were to uphold the [sentencing] under 
the Utah [Rules of Criminal Procedure], the 
result would be different under either the 
Utah or the federal constitution. We will 
therefore treat the contention as a single 
argument with three legal bases rather than 
as three separate arguments. 
State v Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229. 1232 n. 3 
(Utah 1996). 
[5][6] <[ 12 To require an explicit warning that 
sentencing will proceed even in the defendant's 
voluntary absence is to conclude that, without such a 
warning, defendants will assume they have the right 
to avoid sentencing simply by refusing to appear. 
See Taylor v. United States. 414 U.S. 17, 20, 94 S.Ct. 
194, 196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (per curiam) It is 
inimical to the common respect due our governmental 
institutions for us to indulge in the presumption that 
persons will assume they have the nght to impede the 
judicial system by deliberately absenting themselves 
from criminal proceedmgs to which they are a party. 
See id. ("It seems ... incredible to us ... 'that a 
defendant who flees from a courtroom in the midst of 
a tnal-where judge, jury, witnesses, and lawyers are 
present and ready to continue-wouid not know that 
as a consequence the tnal could continue in his 
absence.' " (citation omitted)). [FN3] "The right at 
issue is the nght to be present." Id. Notice of the 
proceeding is alone sufficient to allow a defendant to 
exercise the right to be present by appearing, or to 
waive that right through voluntary absence. See id. 
Whether it be tnal or sentencing, we must presume 
defendants fully understand that important 
proceedings will go forward without them in the 
event of their voluntary absence. [FN4] Thus, there 
is no need to specially warn defendants of this 
obvious fact. 
FN3. We acknowledge that a defendant who 
tlees in the midst of a trial may have more 
reason to know that the proceedings A HI 
move forward m his absence than a 
defendant who absents himself from 
sentencing after entering a guilty plea. We 
nevertheless remain unpersuaded that a 
warning is required to disabuse defendants 
of the belief that they may prevent their own 
sentencing through deliberate absence from 
the sentencing proceeding. We therefore. 
again, do not distinguish between the right 
to be present at trial from the right ro be 
present at sentencing, in terms of what t>pe 
of notice is required to deem a defendant's 
voluntary absence a knowing waiver of the 
neht to be present See note I 
Copr. C West 2002 No Claim to Ong I" S. Govt. Works 
31 P 3d 615 
(Cite as: 31 P.3d 615. 621) 
PaaeS 
FN4. Nor is this some unique feature of the 
judicial system that will be foreign to the 
average citizen. Whether one is a season 
ticket holder or a team member, a scheduled 
basketball game will go forward whether or 
not he or she shows up. If one does not 
appear for a scheduled dental or medical 
appointment, he or she should expect to be 
billed anyway. If one misses an 
employment interview without prior 
explanation, he or she knows the job will go 
to someone else. While the uniqueness of 
judicial business makes these examples less 
than perfect, the expectation in 
contemporary American society is that one 
should appear at duly scheduled events or 
be willing to accept the ramifications of his 
or her voluntary absence. In most social 
and commercial arenas, an expectation of 
unexcused absence without consequence is 
not the order of the day. 
*! 13 Wanosik observes that although neither 
Wagstaff nor Anderson addresses whether a specific 
warning is required, such a requirement would not be 
inconsistent with the holdings of those cases. 
However, the only federal case Wanosik cites directly 
supporting his proposition that a specific warning is 
required to inform defendants that sentencing may 
proceed in their voluntary absence is United States v. 
McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C.Cir.1969), which 
held that such a warning is required. See id. at 
1129-30. The United States Supreme Court has, 
however, explicitly rejected McPherson 's holding 
requiring such a warning. See Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20 
n. 3, 94 S.Ct. at 196 n. 3 ("[T]he Court of Appeals ... 
disagreed with *622 McPherson, and, in our view, 
rightly so."). [FN5] Nonetheless, Wanosik maintains 
that McPherson 's holding is good law and cites the 
more recent United States Supreme Court case, 
Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 113 S.Ct. 748, 
122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993), as "further support for the 
McPherson requirement." Crosby, however, does not 
undermine Taylor 's rejection of McPherson ' s 
warning requirement. 
FN5. Wanosik observes that the Utah 
Supreme Court has cited McPherson with 
approval. See State v. Anderson, 929 P 2d 
1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). However, the 
Utah Supreme Court's reliance on 
McPherson extended only to the proposition 
that "[t]o intentionally relinquish the right 
to be present, the defendant must have 
notice of the proceedings." Id. Nowhere 
does Anderson intimate that any further 
warning is required. Indeed, Anderson 
implicitly rejects the notion that a further 
warning is required by affirming the 
sentencing, in absentia, of a defendant who. 
although he waived in writing his right to be 
present at trial, was not explicitly warned 
that sentencing would proceed in his 
voluntary absence. See id at 1110-1 1. 
c
 14 Crosby interprets Rule 43 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure and holds that, under the 
explicit language of that rule, a court may never 
commence trial in a defendant's absence. [FN6] See 
506 U.S. at 258-62, 113 S.Ct. at 751-53. The 
Crosby Court also observes, however, that under Rule 
43 a defendant's absence after trial has commenced 
will automatically be deemed a knowing waiver of the 
right to be present, even without prior warning to the 
defendant regarding the consequences of voluntary 
absence. See 506 U.S. at 261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 752. 
Thus, like Taylor. Crosby concludes that in 
circumstances where the federal rules otherwise allow 
for trial in absentia, a warning is not required to 
inform defendants that voluntary absence will likely-
result in trial in absentia. See Crosby, 506 U.S. at 
261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 752; Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20. 94 
S.Ct. at 196. 
FN6. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules ot 
Criminal Procedure states in relevant part: 
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall 
be present at the arraignment, at the time o\ 
the plea, at every stage of the trial including 
the impaneling of the jury and the return of 
the verdict, and at the imposition of 
sentence, except as otherwise provided by 
this rule, (b) Continued Presence Not 
Required. The further progress of the trial 
to and including the return of the verdict 
shall not be prevented and the defendant 
shall be considered to have waived the right 
to be present whenever a defendant, initially 
present, 
(I) is voluntarily absent after the trial has 
commenced (whether or not the defendant 
has been informed by the court o\ the 
obligation to remain during the trial)[ ] 
["] c 15 Significantly, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
differ in an important respect highlighted by Crosb\ 
Federal Rule 43 treats differently absence at the 
commencement oi trial from absence after the 
commencement of trial. See Fed.R.Cnm.P. 43; 
Crosbv. 506 U.S. at 258-62. 113 S.Ct. at ""51 -53. 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure draw no such 
distinction, but rather treat a defendant's absence at 
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any stage of criminal proceedings similarly to the 
federal rule's treatment of a defendant's absence after 
commencement of trial. [FN7] Compare Utah 
R.Crim. P. 17(a)(2), 22(b) with Fed.R.Cnm.P. 43(a) 
& (b)(1). Thus, for our purposes, the significance of 
Crosby is that it affirms the United States Supreme 
Court's view that a warning of the consequences of 
voluntary absence is not required to deem a 
defendant's absence after commencement of trial 
voluntary. Our holding, therefore, accords with that 
of the United States Supreme Court when we 
conclude that a defendant need not be warned that the 
proceedings may go forward in his absence in order 
to deem voluntary absence a knowing waiver of the 
right to be present. Thus, although at least one state 
mandates awarnmg like that required in McPherson. 
see People v. Link 291 Ill.App.3d 1064, 226 Ill.Dec. 
369, 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (1997), we, with the 
United States Supreme Court, decline to adopt 
McPherson 's holding. 
FN7. Rule 17(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states: 
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable 
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence 
from the trial after notice to defendant of the 
time for trial shall not prevent the case from 
being tried and a verdict or judgment 
entered therein shall have the same effect as 
if defendant had been present.... 
Furthermore. Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(b) states: "On the same 
grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence, defendant may 
likewise be sentenced in defendant's 
absence." 
*623 *[ 16 Wanosik was given notice of the date and 
time of his sentencing. He had the right to appear if 
he chose; he had no right to assume the matter could 
be taken care of some other time, when he felt more 
in the mood to attend. We see no error in the trial 
court's failure to specifically warn Wanosik that 
sentencing would proceed in the event of his 
voluntary absence from the proceeding. 
B. Balancing of Interests 
[8) *l 17 Relying on two in a line of cases from the 
Second Circuit, Wanosik argues that even if a 
defendant's absence is properly deemed knowing and 
voluntary, a trial court may not proceed unless "the 
public interest in proceeding clearly outweighs the 
interest of the voluntarily absent defendant m 
attending." Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 7 3. 76 (2nd 
Page1) 
Cir). cert, denied, 528 U.S. 884, 120 S.Ct. 200. 145 
L.Ed.2d 168 (1999). See United States v Fontanel. 
878 F.2d 33. 37 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
c
 18 The Second Circuit acknowledges "that while i it 
believes] prudential concerns animate the need for a 
balancing of interests before a district court exercises 
its discretion to conduct a trial in absentia, all that the 
Constitution requires is a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the right to be present at trial" Mann. P 3 
F.3d at 76 (emphasis added). Accord Clark v. Scott. 
70 F.3d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1995), cert, denied. 528 
U.S. 884, 120 S.Ct. 200, 145 L.Ed.2d 168 (1999). 
The Second Circuit has thus, out of "prudential 
concerns," hedged their trial courts' discretion to 
proceed in a defendant's absence by imposing a 
judicially created balancing test not required by either 
the federal rules or the United States Constitution. 
W*e decline the invitation to adopt a similar balancing 
test in Utah. When a defendant's absence from a 
criminal proceeding is properly deemed knowing and 
voluntary, the trial court may proceed without further 
inquiry or analysis. Therefore, it was not error for the 
trial court in this case to fail to balance the public 
interest in proceeding against Wanosik's interest in 
being present. 
C. Voluntariness Inquiry 
[9][10][11H 19 We have concluded that a trial court 
is not required to warn a defendant that trial or 
sentencing may proceed in the defendant's voluntary 
absence. We have also concluded that a trial court is 
not required to balance the public interest in 
resolving the matter against the defendant's interest m 
being present before proceeding in a defendant's 
voluntary absence. However, a trial court may not 
assume a defendant's knowing absence is voluntary, 
but rather is required to determine whether a 
defendant's absence is in fact voluntary. [FN8] See 
State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam). We therefore review whether the trial court 
in this case properly concluded that Wanosik's 
absence at sentencing was actually voluntary. 
FN8. The fact that a defendant was 
informed of the time and place of the 
proceeding allows a court to presume that a 
defendant's absence therefrom is knowing. 
i.e.. that the defendant knows he is missing 
the proceeding. The fact that an absent 
defendant had notice of the proceeding joes 
not. however, allow a presumption that 
absence therefrom is \oluntar\- Sec Hun::. 
"14 P 2d at 678. After all. <uch a 
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defendant may be incarcerated on another 
charge or comatose in a hospital 
*] 20 The sum of the trial court's oral findings and 
analysis on the voluntariness of Wanosik's absence at 
sentencing is the following [FN9] "I can only 
assume because he has not been in touch with 
[defense counsel] nor has he been in touch with my 
court that he has chosen to voluntarily absent himself 
from these proceedings." We do not question the 
underlying findings of the trial court, I e , that 
Wanosik had not been in touch with counsel or the 
court. These findings, however, suggest nothing 
more than that no one knew why Wanosik was absent 
With no reliable information on the voluntariness of 
Wanosik's absence, the trial court merely assumed 
that Wanosik's absence was voluntary [FN 10] 
FN9 The trial court's written findings and 
conclusions do not substantively differ from 
what the court stated orally at the hearing 
FN 10 As hereafter more fully explained, 
case law rejects the legitimacy of such an 
assumption, but it is not intrinsically an 
unreasonable one Statistically, the vast 
majority of court no-shows spaced it out, 
could not muster the courage or effort to be 
present, or got sidetracked in some 
volitional way Only a tiny minority find 
themselves comatose or otherwise 
involuntanlv incapacitated at the time of 
trial or sentencing Even those who are 
incarcerated, assuming it is in this state, 
usually have the means to let their 
circumstances be known. Cf In re A E, 
2001 UT App 202, % 5, 29 P 3d 31 ("Father 
was not transported from the jail for the 
trial because he did not inform jail officials 
of the trial dates ") 
*624 [12][13][14][15] 1[ 21 "[Voluntariness may not 
be presumed by the trial court." Houtz, 714 P 2d at 
678 Rather, an inquiry into the defendant's ability to 
appear at the proceeding is required. See id We 
have not previously detailed the type of inquiry 
required to determine if a defendant's absence is 
voluntary We have, however, outlined some general 
principles 
Voluntariness is determined by considering the 
totality of the circumstances The state carries 
the burden of showing voluntariness. A 
defendant must have a compelling reason to stay 
away rrom the trial If his absence is deliberate 
without a sound reason, the trial may start in his 
absence 
State v Wagstaff, lnl P 2d 987. 990 (Ltah 
Ct App 1989) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted) This case presents an opportunity to 
elaborate on these general principles 
[16][17] <1 22 In such circumstances, the State must 
make a preliminary showing, based on reasonable 
inquiry, that defendant's absence is voluntary Except 
as otherwise required by the attorney-client privilege, 
defense counsel has an obligation to aid the State by 
being forthcoming with any information defense 
counsel may have that could be helpful in 
determining the defendant's whereabouts or reasons 
for the defendant's absence Wrhen neither court nor 
counsel have information as to why the defendant is 
not present, a continuance will ordinarily be required 
to allow the prosecution and defense counsel an 
opportunity to inquire into the defendants 
whereabouts and the reasons for his absence 
[ 18][ 19] <I 23 Ascertaining whether a defendant's 
absence is voluntary will often be difficult if the 
defendant is simply a no-show While we need not 
in this case definitively prescribe what the State must 
do to meet its preliminary burden, and while the 
showing it must make will vary with the facts and 
circumstances of particular cases, some avenues for 
establishing voluntariness are- (1) inquiry of law 
enforcement agencies to determine whether the 
defendant is incarcerated, see Houtz, 714 P 2d at 678 
("When a defendant is in custody, he is not free to 
make a voluntary decision about whether or not he 
will attend the court proceedings "), (2) inquiry o( 
local hospitals as to whether the defendant has been 
admitted to one of them, cf State v Ross, 655 P 2d 
641, 642 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) ("Trial proceeded 
for four days, when on the fifth day, defendant failed 
to appear He was found in a Salt Lake City hospital 
suffering from a heart attack, diagnosed as minor 
His doctor contacted the court and recommended a 
one-month continuance"), (3) inquiry of the 
detendant's employer, if the employer can be readilv 
determined, as to the employer's possible knowledge 
or the defendant's whereabouts, (4) a reasonably 
diligent attempt to contact defendant at his residence 
or other place counsel knows the defendant to 
frequent, (5) inquiry of Pretrial Services or other 
entity supervising defendant's presentence release 
and (6) inquiry of any bail bond company or other 
person or entity posting bond to secure defendants 
appearance Once inquiry appropriate to the case has 
been made, and a compelling reason for the 
detendants absence remains unknown, voluntariness 
while not guarantied, may then be properlv interred 
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*! 24 Defense counsel, however, must then have the 
opportunity to rebut the inference of voluntariness 
Defense counsel may by that time have gathered 
additional information regarding the defendant's 
whereabouts and may, for example, be able to 
contend that although no local hospital shows the 
defendant as currentlv registered, his roommate says 
he took him to the emergency room the previous 
evening, suggesting the possible in voluntariness of 
the defendant's absence at a proceeding early the next 
morning 
*] 25 In this case, the State made no preliminary 
showing of voluntariness whatever, and the trial court 
erred by making "inadequate inquiry into [Wanosik's] 
ability to appear *625 on [May 26, 2000] or his 
subsequent availability before deciding that he had 
waived his right to be present at [sentencing] " 
Houtz 714 P 2d at 678 
D Harmless Error 
[20][21] *| 26 A trial court's error in failing to 
conduct an adequate inquiry into whether a 
defendant's absence was voluntary does not merit 
reversal, however, unless the defendant was 
prejudiced by the lack of adequate inquiry See State 
v Anderson 929 P 2d 1107, 1111-12 (Utah 1996) 
("It stands to reason that a defendant cannot demand 
repetition of a trial or sentencing in which he suffered 
no unfairness") When finally apprehended, 
Wanosik sent a letter to the trial court candidly 
acknowledging 'I do not have a legitimate excuse" 
for not appearing for sentencing. Based on 
Wanosik's subsequent concession of actual voluntary 
absence at sentencing, we conclude that Wanosik 
suffered no prejudice by the trial court's failure to 
make adequate inquiry into whether his absence was 
voluntary Accordingly, the court's error in 
proceeding to impose sentence was, in this case, 
harmless 
II Sentencing Procedure 
c
 21 Wanosik argues that, even if proceeding with 
sentencing in his absence was appropriate, M[t]he trial 
court violated due process and Utah R Cnm P 22 [ 
(a) ] when it sentenced [him] without considering 
relevant and reliable information and without 
atfording defense counsel or the prosecutor the 
opportunit\ to speak at sentencing " 
\ Rule 22(a) 
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[22] c 28 We first address Wanosiks claim that the 
trial court violated rule 22(a) of the Ltah Rules ot 
Criminal Procedure [FN 11] The second paragraph 
of rule 22(a) states 
FN11 The State asserts that Wanosik must 
show plain error with regard to his ruje 
22(a) claim on appeal because he did not 
preserve the claim below We observe 
'that rule 22(e) [of the Ltah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure] permits the court ot 
appeals to consider the legalitv of a sentence 
even if the issue is raised for the first time 
on appeal " State \ Brooks 908 P 2d 8^ 6 
860 (Utah 1995) The Brooks holding 
obviates the need for appellants to show 
plain error in asserting on appeal 
unpreserved claims that the sentence 
imposed by the trial court was illegal Ste 
id at 858-60 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford 
the defendant an opportunity to make a statement 
and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why 
sentence should not be imposed The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to 
the imposition of sentence 
Utah R Cnm P 22(a) Initially, we must determine 
whether Wanosik waived his rights under rule 22(a) 
by voluntarily absenting himself from the sentencing 
proceeding. 
[23][24] <| 29 A defendant's personal exercise of the 
rights granted in rule 22(a) is referred to as 
allocution See State v Anderson 929 P 2d 110" 
1110-12 (Utah 1996), State v Kelbach 23 Utah 2d 
231, 461 P2d 297, 299 (1969), \acatea and 
remanded 408 U S 935, 92 S Ct 2858, }} L Ed 2d 
"51 (1972) '[Allocution] is an inseparable part ot 
the right to be present, which [a] defendant waived] 
bv his voluntary absence ' Anderson 929 P 2d at 
1111 Wranosik, therefore bv his voluntarv absence 
waived the right to personally make a statement at 
sentencing and to personally present information in 
mitigation of punishment or to show legal cause whv 
sentence should not be imposed See id 
f25][26][27] «] 30 A defendant does not. however 
altogether waive his rule 22(a) rights through 
voluntary absence at sentencing he waives onlv the 
right to personally exercise them 'Sentencing is a 
critical stage ot a criminal proceeding at which a 
defendant is entitled to the effective assistance ot 
counsel ' State i Casartz 6>6 P 2d 1Q0> loo" 
to Orig I S Govt Works 
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(Utah 1982), and the nght to effective assistance of 
counsel cannot be waived through voluntary absence 
alone See State v Bakalov 1999 LT 45 « 16, 9^9 
P 2d ~99 (holding that, in order to waive the right to 
counsel and "invoke the right of self-representation, a 
defendant must in a timely manner ' 'clearly and 
unequivocally" ' request [self-representation]" 
(citations omitted)) Furthermore, rule 22(a) 
unequivocally directs the *626 sentencing court to 
"give[ ] [the prosecuting attorney] an opportunity to 
present any information matenal to the imposition of 
sentence " Utah R Cnm P 22(a) It would be 
patently unfair, in the case of an absent defendant, to 
hear only from the prosecuting attorney and not from 
defense counsel regardmg sentencing considerations 
Thus, we hold that a sentencing court is required to 
afford a voluntarily absent defendant the opportunity 
to exercise his rule 22(a) rights through counsel 
*[ 31 At sentencing in this case, the trial court did 
hear briefly from defense counsel on the issue of 
Wanosik's absence concerning any "legal cause why 
sentence should not [have been] imposed" at that 
time, Utah RCnm P 22(a), briefly addressed that 
issue as discussed above, and then proceeded to 
impose sentence However, before proceeding with 
sentencing, the trial court heard from neither defense 
counsel nor the prosecutor with regard to 
"information in mitigation of punishment" or "any 
[other] information matenal to the imposition of 
sentence " Id The State argues that under rule 22(a) 
the burden rests on counsel to request an opportunity 
to present information relevant to sentencing The 
State's argument is contrary to the plain language of 
the rule and the construction given it in case law 
*! 32 The language of the rule is that "the court shall 
afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation 
ot punishment" Utah R Cnm. P 22(a) (emphasis 
added) Thus, the rule imposes an affirmative 
obligation on the trial court to extend the opportunity 
to be heard, it does not contemplate the court will 
passively wait for counsel to make a request to be 
heard Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has 
said that rule 22(a) "directs tnal courts to hear 
evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution 
that is relevant to the sentence to be imposed " State 
v Howell ^07 P2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) [FN12] 
This directive is nowhere made conditional on a 
preliminary request by counsel to present the 
information Even if a defendant is voluntarily 
absent the trial court has the duty to set its 
aggravation aside and impose a reasonable sentence 
Page 12 
and to that end the court is required to hear evidence 
trom both sides relevant to sentencing The onus is 
thus on the trial court to "afford" the defendant and to 
'give' the prosecutor the opportunity to present 
relevant information [FN13] Utah R Cnm P 22(a) 
The trial court in this case erred by not atfording 
defense counsel an opportunity to present information 
in mitigation of punishment or giving the prosecutor 
an opportunity to present information relevant to 
sentencing 
FN 12 Howell actually interpreted the 
predecessor of Ltah Rule ot Criminal 
Procedure 22(a), Ltah Code Ann $ 
77-35-22(a) (1982) See ^ 07 P 2d at 118 
Current rule 22(a) differs from then-section 
77-35-22(a) only in that rule 22(a) omits the 
words "in his own behalf from section 
77-35-22(a)'s sentence Before imposing 
sentence the court shall afford the defendant 
an opportunity to make a statement in his 
own behalj and to present any information 
in mitigation of punishment ' Ltah Code 
Ann § 7"?-35-22(a) (1982) (emphasis 
added) See also Utah R Cnm P 22(a) 
If anything, deletion of the italicized phrase 
emphasizes that while defendant is entitled 
to make a statement, he need not personallv 
make it 
FN 13 We [here] note that it is not just the 
defendant, but the State as well that has an 
interest in the sentence being based on 
accurate information Decisions as to the 
type of rehabilitation program if anv to 
which a defendant is assigned and the 
duration of incarceration both influence the 
allocation of scarce personnel and monetarv 
resources Such decisions should be based 
upon the most reliable data possible as to 
each defendant so that this State ma\ deal 
with its criminal justice program as 
efficientiv as possible 
State v Casarez 656 P 2d 1005 1008 
(Ltah 1082) 
[28] *I 33 Noncompliance with rule 22(a) in this ^ase 
was not harmless, as the State suggests Had either 
detense counsel or the prosecutor been given a 
chance to address \? Sc P's recommendation that 
Vvanosik be sentenced to 20 davs in jail with credit 
tor time served and that he then be comrruned to a 
substance abuse treatment program, the sentencing 
outcome for Wanosik mav well have been more 
favorable than the maximum sentences imposed b\ 
the trial court Thus we \acate \\ anosiks sentences 
and remand tor resentencing 
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*627 B Due Process Requirements at Sentencing 
[29][30][31][32] <| 34 Due Process considerations 
underscore the propriety of our remand for 
resentencing The due process clause of Article 1, 
Section 7 o( the Utah Constitution, requires that a 
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and 
relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing 
a sentence." State v Howell, 707 P 2d 115, 118 
(Utah 1985). "A sentence in a criminal case should 
be appropriate for the defendant in light of his 
background and the crime committed and also serve 
the interests of society which underlie the criminal 
justice system." State v McClendon, 611 P 2d 728, 
729 (Utah 1980). "[T]he sentencing judgef ][has] 
discretion in determining what punishment fits both 
the crime and the offender," but we have consistently 
sought "to shore up the soundness and reliability of 
the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in 
the exercise of that sentencing discretion." State v 
Lpsky. 608 P 2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980) (requiring 
disclosure of presentence report to defendant prior to 
sentencing). Although rule 22(a) implements sound 
procedures aimed at insuring that the trial court bases 
its sentencing decision on such information, a 
criminal defendant's right to be sentenced based on 
relevant and reliable information regarding his crime, 
his background, and the interests of society stands 
independent of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
22(a). 
<! 35 The record in this case fails to disclose any 
relevant or reliable information, other than the fact 
that defendant was absent from the proceeding, relied 
on by the trial court in imposing maximum—albeit 
concurrent-sentences for both crimes. Voluntary 
absence from sentencing may properly serve as one 
factor in determining an appropriate sentence, as it is 
an mdirect-but telling-indication of the defendant's 
suitability for probation or susceptibility to 
rehabilitative efforts. It is not, however, sufficient to 
rely upon that fact alone in deciding what sentence to 
impose, nor may such absence be punished by 
imposing a sentence more severe than is otherwise 
warranted. From all that appears in the record, 
however, Wanosik's absence at sentencing was the 
Pa?e 13 
only information considered by the trial court m 
deciding what sentences to impose. 
*] 36 Wanosik's Due Process rights were 
compromised by the trial court's failure to base its 
sentencing decision on relevant and reliable 
information regarding the crime, Wanosik's 
background, and the interests of society For the 
same reasons noted in the preceding section, the trial 
court's failure to base its sentencing decision on 
relevant and reliable information was not harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
1] 37 A defendant informed of the time and place for 
sentencing need not be further informed that 
sentencing may proceed in the defendant's voluntary 
absence. Furthermore, a sentencing court need not 
balance society's interest in proceeding against a 
voluntarily absent defendant with the defendant's 
interest in being present before proceeding with 
sentencing in absentia. In this case, the trial court's 
only error in regard to proceeding in absentia was its 
inadequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of 
Wanosik's absence. The error was, however, harmless 
given Wanosik's later concession that his absence was 
indeed voluntary. 
*| 38 Nonetheless, the trial court erred in not 
complying with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
22(a) by failing to afford defendant, through his 
counsel, an opportunity to present information in 
mitigation of punishment and by failing to also give 
the prosecutor an opportunity to present information 
relevant to sentencing. This course was also at odds 
with Wanosik's Due Process rights, as the court failed 
to base its sentencing decision on relevant and 
reliable information. 
*i 39 We vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand for 
resentencing. 
«I 40 WE CONCUR NORMAN H JACKSON. 
Associate Presiding Judge, WILLIAM A THORNE, 
Jr, Judge 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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ADDENDUM B 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, 
unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and 
to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may 
likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for 
defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall 
enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. 
Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the 
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it 
with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
(0 Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender 
committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l )(b), 
the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—-00O00—-
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Shepard Wheeler, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000107-CA 
F I L E D 
September 27, 2001 
ll 2001 UT App 276 [[ 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: 
Kristine M. Rogers, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme. 
ORME. Judge: 
Our resolution of this appeal is governed by our recent decision in State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241 428 
Utah Adv. Rep. 10, as acknowledged in the State's supplemental memorandum filed herein at the court's 
request. For essentially the reasons explained in Wanosik, we vacate appellant's sentence and remand for 
resentencing. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
James Z. Davis. Judge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—- 00O00—-
State of Utah. 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jon Donald Hamling, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000813-CA 
F I L E D 
September 13, 2001 
|| 2001 UTApp267j | 
Third District Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: 
Nisa Sisneros and Joan Watt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Jon Donald Hamling appeals his sentence imposed in absentia. Hamling pleaded guilty to attempted 
possession of a controlled substance, a class A misaemeanor At the time of his plea, he was given a 
sentencing hearing date of August 4, 2001. and told to contact Adult Probation and Parole for the preparation 
of a presentence report. Hamling was also ordered released pending sentencing. Hamling participated in the 
preparation of the presentence report and provided information to Adult Probation and Parole 
Hamling did not appear at his sentencing hearing. Defense counsel indicated that she had had contact with 
him two weeks prior to the sentencing date, but not since then The court determined that, because Hamling 
had not contacted the court and he was not at the sentencing hearing, he had voluntarily absented himself 
from the proceedings. The judge gave defense counsel an opportunity to provide sentencing information 
Counsel spoke on Hamling's behalf and the judge then without affording the prosecution an opportunity to 
address sentencing, imposed a sentence of one year of incarceration, the maximum penalty for a class A 
misdemeanor. Defense counsel filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the trial court, which was 
denied, and this appeal followed. 
In sentencing Hamiing in absentia, the prosecution bears the burden of making a preliminary showing, based 
on reasonable inquiry, that defendant's absence is voluntary. State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241 .fl22. 428 
Utah Adv. Rep. 10. Only after inquiry, the court, in appropriate circumstances, may infer that the defendant's 
absence is voluntary. Id. at fi23. Defense counsel must "then have the opportunity to rebut the inference of 
voluntariness." Id. atfl24. The court did not require any evidence from the State and inferred Hamiing was 
voluntarily absent based solely on the fact that the defendant was not present and none of the parties had 
contact with him within two weeks prior to sentencing. 
When neither the court nor counsel have information as to why the defendant is absent, the court should grant 
a continuance to allow reasonable inquiry into his nonappearance. Id. at fl22. This court, in Wanosik. set forth 
some factors the court may consider in determining whether an absence is voluntary. Id. at t[23. 
Upon remand, sentencing must be in accordance with the procedure set forth in Wanosik. Id. at fi38. Such 
procedure includes giving both the defense and the prosecution the opportunity to make a statement prior to 
sentencing 
Lastly, the State argues that post-sentencing trial court docket entries, made after the defendant was 
subsequently arrested, reflect no good reason why the defendant failed to appear at his sentencing. These 
later developments have no bearing on whether the defendant was sentenced lawfully as post-sentencing 
information was not considered in the court's determination of voluntariness. 
We vacate Hamiing's sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with State v. Wanosik. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Jose Luis Vicente appeals the sentence on his conviction of Attempted Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(m) 
(1999). 
The issues raised in Vicente's appeal are the same issues determined in State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241. 
31 P.3d 615. regarding sentencing in absentia and a criminal defendant's Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 
(a) and Due Process rights. Accordingly, Vicente is entitled to be resentenced under Wanosik because the 
district court did not (1) make an adequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Vicentes absence before 
proceeding to sentence him in absentia; (2) provide Vicente with the opportunity to present information through 
counsel in mitigation of punishment and also provide the prosecutor an opportunity to present information 
relevant to sentencing; and (3) base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information regarding the 
crime, defendant's background, and the interests of society See id. at fflI36-38. 
The State seeks dismissal of this appeal, relying upon cases concluding that an appeal taken by a criminal 
defendant who is a fugitive may be dismissed, subject to reinstatement if the defendant returns to the 
jurisdiction and if the State cannot demonstrate that it will be prejudiced by reinstatement See. e g . State v 
Tuttle. 713 P.2d 773, 705 (Utah 1985). Because Wanosik is dispositive of Vicente's appeal and requires a 
remand for resentencing, we decline to dismiss this appeal.11' However, if Vicente appeals the sentence 
imposed after remand, the State may raise the dismissal argument in the subsequent appeal. 
We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with Wanosik. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1 Even if we were to dismiss this appeal, Vicente could challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22 
(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Cnm. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct. . a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."); see also Wanosik, 241 UT App at n.11 (stating issues 
regarding illegality of the sentence under Rule 22(a) can be considered for the first time on appeal under Rule 
22(e)). Judicial economy suggests that we resolve the appeal from the sentence and preserve the State's 
ability to seek dismissal in any appeal taKen after resentencing. 
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PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Robert Leon Gardner appeals the sentences on his convictions for Shoplifting and Attempted Escape 
from Official Custody, both class A misdemeanors. This case is before the court on appellant's motion for 
summary disposition. 
Appellant raises the same issues regarding sentencing in absentia that this court previously determined in 
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615. Consequently, appellant is entitled to be resentenced 
because the trial court made no inquiry to establish if defendant's absence was in fact voluntary See id. at Tf23 
The State seeks, dismissal of the appeal arguing that appellant has failed to demonstrate any harm as a result 
of his sentencing in absentia. However, because the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, Wanosik is 
dispositive of this appeal and requires us to remand for resentencing. 
Accordingly, we grant the motion for summary disposition, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing 
in accordance with Wanosik. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
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PER CURIAM: 
Wilkensen seeks to appeal the October 4, 2000 order whereby the trial court sentenced him in absentia 
However, the trial court subsequently granted Wilkensen s motion to resentence, vacated the October 4th 
sentence, and resentenced Wilkensen on December 1st with Wilkensen present. 
An issue is moot when "the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." State v Sims. 881 
P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994). However, moot issues may be considered if a case "presents an issue that affects 
the public interest, is likely to recur, and because of the brief time anyone is affected, is capable of evading 
review." Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah Ct App. 1987). This appeal is moot and. though it 
presents important issues, these issues will not evade review There are other cases pending before the court. 
several of which are briefed, which raise the same issues raised in this appeal. See e.g.. State v. Wheeler. 
Case No. 20000107; State v. Wanosik, 20000541; State v Payne, 20000497. 
Moreover, because the trial court set aside the sentencing order sought to be appealed, it does not appear that 
we have jurisdiction over Wiikensen's appeal. 
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge 
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ORME, Judge: 
This appeal raises the same issues.as those raised in State v Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, regarding in 
absentia sentencing and a criminal defendant's Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) and Due Process rights 
at sentencing. As with the defendant in Wanosik, Payne requests that we vacate his sentence and remand for 
resentencing. During the pendency of this appeal, however, Payne was resentenced, and at resentencing the 
trial court imposed a more lenient sentence than it imposed initially. 
Subsequent to Payne's resentencing, we received a Suggestion of Mootness from the State. The State asserts 
that at resentencing Payne was afforded those rights he claims to have been denied at his initial sentencing-
an assertion Payne does not contest-and requests that we dismiss Payne's appeal as moot. We have delayed 
ruling on the State's Suggestion of Mootness in order to ensure that our opinion in Wanosik would resolve all of 
the issues common to the two appeals.l1) 
Wanosik did. however, resolve each of the issues raised in this appeal, and Payne having already received the 
resentencing he requests, the State's Suggestion of Mootness is well-taken We dismiss this appeal as moot 
http^courtl ink.utcourts.eov/o^ Uf™ 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
William A. Thome, Jr., Judge 
1. Had we been unable in Wanosik to resolve all of the issues raised in both Payne's and Wanosik's appeals, 
we would have decided whether to address any remaining issues through a published opinion in this case 
under the public policy exception to the mootness doctrine. See generally In re S.L., 1999 UT App 390,fl40, 
995 P.2d 17; Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Richard Bruce Bird appeals the sentence on his conviction of Attempted Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class A misdemeanor, This case is before the court on appellant's motion for summary 
disposition. 
Appellant raises the same issues regarding sentencing in absentia that this court previously determined m 
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615. Consequently, appellant is entitled to be resentenced 
because the trial court made no inquiry to establish if defendant's absence was in fact voluntary. See id. at fi23 
The State seeks dismissal of the appeal based upon the fact that appellant remains a fugitive from justice See 
State v. Turtle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985). However Wanosik is dispositive of this appeal and requires us 
to remand for resentencing. If appellant appeals the sentence imposed after remand, the State is free to raise 
the dismissal argument based on Tuttle in the subsequent appeal See State v. Samora, 2001 UT App 266 ^3 
&n.1, 429 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (per curiam). 
Accordingly, we grant the motion for summary disposition, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing 
in accordance with Wanosik. 
httn:/eourTl ink utenurK POV/nnininncrnrU/hirrl rh htm i X (P 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
